Notes on Karl Jaspers Psychology of World Approaches

A modern translation of Martin Heidegger's early work "Notes on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of World Approaches", originally published in 1919. This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading.

Composed during Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures (1919–1923), these fragmented critiques dissect Jaspers’ 1919 text, exposing a tension between existential Existenz and the residual subjectivism of “worldview” (Weltanschauung) psychology. Heidegger, then transitioning from Neo-Kantianism to his existential analytic, attacks Jaspers’ reliance on “life” as a vague, psychologized category, arguing it perpetuates the very Cartesian subject-object split it seeks to overcome. For Heidegger, Jaspers’ “worldviews” remain static typologies—pre-given frameworks imposed on existence—rather than probing the ontological conditions of being-in-the-world. The notes sketch an alternative: Dasein’s pre-thematic engagement with Being, where “world” is not a perspective to adopt but the horizon of meaning disclosed through care (Sorge) and thrownness (Geworfenheit). 

Heidegger critically engages with Jaspers' exploration of the limits of the soul's life and how this leads to a clearer overall horizon for understanding the soul. Heidegger's approach is characterized by his typical philosophical depth, focusing on the methodological aspects and fundamental implications of Jaspers' work. Heidegger examines how Jaspers' psychology attempts to provide clarifications and possibilities for self-contemplation, emphasizing its philosophical rather than scientific nature. Heidegger also critiques Jaspers' approach to psychology from a philosophical perspective, questioning the basic assumptions and methods employed. He discusses the role of Weltanschauungspsychologie in understanding mental positions, processes, and stages, and how this effort is consistent with philosophical inquiry. Heidegger's analysis is not only a critique of Jaspers' psychological theories, but also a broader inquiry into the nature of human understanding and the role of psychology in this process. He reflects on the limitations and potential biases in Jaspers' approach, particularly in how it frames and interprets human existence and consciousness. Throughout the paper, Heidegger's examination is deeply rooted in his own philosophical framework, using his own distinctive terminology and concepts to dissect and understand Jaspers' psychological approach.

Heidegger’s critique here is proto-Being and Time: Jaspers’ failure to ask how worldhood structures existence mirrors metaphysics’ neglect of Being. Yet the notes also reveal Heidegger’s debt to Jaspers—the focus on finitude, anxiety, and historicity—even as he dismantles their psychological framing. By rejecting “worldview” as a hermeneutic key, Heidegger clears ground for his radical claim that truth (aletheia) emerges not from subjective interpretation but Dasein’s situated openness. These fragments, elliptical yet incisive, mark a pivot: the young lecturer shedding academic psychology for the primordial question of Being, a shift that would redefine 20th-century thought.