Phenomenology of the View and Impression of the Theory of Philosophical Conceptual Debt

Heidegger's work critically examines the role and function of a "theory of philosophical concept formation" in phenomenology, suggesting that this topic, while seemingly specialized, is essential for understanding broader philosophical issues. The text debates the nature and implications of phenomenological methods, touching on topics like the relationship between absolute and relative concepts, the problem of life as a central phenomenon, and the dichotomy between rational and irrational elements in philosophy. It also explores historical and cultural contexts in philosophy, analyzing how these aspects influence philosophical thinking and concept formation. Heidegger focuses on phenomenological destruction (Destruktion) in philosophy, particularly in the context of phenomenology. It highlights the importance of understanding the origin and direction of meanings in philosophical concepts, emphasizing that these meanings often point to larger, interconnected contexts.

Heidegger also discusses the phenomenon of "pre-signing" (Vorzeichnung) and "pre-grasping" (Vorgriff), explaining that these are fundamental to understanding how multiple meanings and unity of meaning are characterized and founded. It notes that phenomenological destruction is inherently linked to the act of philosophizing and is not just a methodological tool for limited purposes. This is because philosophy is always an element of factual life experience and not just abstract definitions. Heidegger naturally pivots back to the understanding of history in various contexts, outlining six different meanings of 'history' and how each reflects different aspects of life experience and philosophical inquiry. These meanings range from history as a field of study, to a tradition, to personal or city history, and even to history as an occurrence or incident.