Warranted Christian Belief
ΡΠ°Π½. 2000β―Π³. Β· Oxford University Press
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reportΠΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½Π·ΠΈΠΈΡΠ΅ Π½Π΅ ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ²ΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈ Β ΠΠΎΠ·Π½Π°ΡΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ΅
ΠΠ° Π΅-ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Π°Π²Π°
This is the third volume in Alvin Plantinga's trilogy on the notion of warrant, which he defines as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. In this volume, Plantinga examines warrant's role in theistic belief, tackling the questions of whether it is rational, reasonable, justifiable, and warranted to accept Christian belief and whether there is something epistemically unacceptable in doing so. He contends that Christian beliefs are warranted to the extent that they are formed by properly functioning cognitive faculties, thus, insofar as they are warranted, Christian beliefs are knowledge if they are true.
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ΠΠ° Π°Π²ΡΠΎΡΠΎΡ
Alvin Plantinga is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.
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ΠΠΎΠΆΠ΅ Π΄Π° ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ Π°ΡΠ΄ΠΈΠΎΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ ΠΊΡΠΏΠ΅Π½ΠΈ ΠΎΠ΄ Google Play ΡΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° Π²Π΅Π±-ΠΏΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΡΡΡΠ²Π°ΡΠΎΡ Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΡ.
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ΠΠ° Π΄Π° ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ ΡΠΎ Π΅-ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ»ΠΎ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΎ ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠ΅ Π΅-ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ Kobo, ΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠ΅Π±Π° Π΄Π° ΠΏΡΠ΅Π·Π΅ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠ΅ Π΄Π°ΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ° ΠΈ Π΄Π° ΡΠ° ΠΏΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΎΡ. Π‘Π»Π΅Π΄Π΅ΡΠ΅ Π³ΠΈ Π΄Π΅ΡΠ°Π»Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠΏΠ°ΡΡΡΠ²Π° Π²ΠΎ Π¦Π΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΎΡ Π·Π° ΠΏΠΎΠΌΠΎΡ Π·Π° ΠΏΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ»Π°ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° Π΄Π°ΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΠΊΠΈΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄ΡΠΆΠ°Π½ΠΈ Π΅-ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠΈ.
