States of Affairs
ΠΌΠ°ΠΉ 2013β―Π³. Β· Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis ΠΠ½ΠΈΠ³Π°Β 30 Β· Walter de Gruyter
ΠΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½Π°Ρ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Π°
219
ΠΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡ
reportΠΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ·ΡΠ²Ρ Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ΅Π½Ρ. ΠΠΎΠ΄ΡΠΎΠ±Π½Π΅Π΅β¦
ΠΠ± ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Π΅
States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)? Are they contingent, causally efficacious, spatio-temporal and perceivable entities, or are they abstract objects? What are their constituents and their identity conditions? What are the functions that states of affairs are able to fulfil in a viable theory, and which problems and prima facie counterintuitive consequences arise out of an ontological commitment to them? Are there merely possible (non-actual, non-obtaining) states of affairs? Are there molecular (i.e., negative, conjunctive, disjunctive etc.) states of affairs? Are there modal and tensed states of affairs? In this volume, these and other questions are addressed by David M. Armstrong, Marian David, Herbert Hochberg, Uwe Meixner, L. Nathan Oaklander, Peter Simons, Erwin Tegtmeier and Mark Textor.
ΠΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Ρ
ΠΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡ Ρ Π½Π°ΠΌΠΈ ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΈΠΌ ΠΌΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ.
ΠΠ΄Π΅ ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ
Π‘ΠΌΠ°ΡΡΡΠΎΠ½Ρ ΠΈ ΠΏΠ»Π°Π½ΡΠ΅ΡΡ
Π£ΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Google Play ΠΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Android ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ iPad/iPhone. ΠΠ½ΠΎ ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ
ΡΠΎΠ½ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Ρ Π²Π°ΡΠΈΠΌ Π°ΠΊΠΊΠ°ΡΠ½ΡΠΎΠΌ Π°Π²ΡΠΎΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈ, ΠΈ Π²Ρ ΡΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅ΡΠ΅ ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡ Π»ΡΠ±ΠΈΠΌΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ ΠΎΠ½Π»Π°ΠΉΠ½ ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ»Π°ΠΉΠ½ Π³Π΄Π΅ ΡΠ³ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎ.
ΠΠΎΡΡΠ±ΡΠΊΠΈ ΠΈ Π½Π°ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΡ
Π‘Π»ΡΡΠ°ΠΉΡΠ΅ Π°ΡΠ΄ΠΈΠΎΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³ΠΈ ΠΈΠ· Google Play Π² Π²Π΅Π±-Π±ΡΠ°ΡΠ·Π΅ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅.
Π£ΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π° Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³
Π§ΡΠΎΠ±Ρ ΠΎΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ½ΠΈΠ³Ρ Π½Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π΅ Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ Kobo, ΡΠΊΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΉΡΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΠΉΠ» ΠΈ Π΄ΠΎΠ±Π°Π²ΡΡΠ΅ Π΅Π³ΠΎ Π½Π° ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΎ. ΠΠΎΠ΄ΡΠΎΠ±Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎ Π½Π°ΠΉΡΠΈ Π² Π‘ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΌ ΡΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠ΅.
