Rethinking Counterinsurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Volume 5

ยท
ยท Rand counterinsurgency study แƒฌแƒ˜แƒ’แƒœแƒ˜ 5 ยท Rand Corporation
แƒ”แƒšแƒฌแƒ˜แƒ’แƒœแƒ˜
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แƒ’แƒ•แƒ”แƒ แƒ“แƒ˜
แƒ แƒ”แƒ˜แƒขแƒ˜แƒœแƒ’แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜ แƒ“แƒ แƒ›แƒ˜แƒ›แƒแƒฎแƒ˜แƒšแƒ•แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜ แƒ“แƒแƒฃแƒ“แƒแƒกแƒขแƒฃแƒ แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ”แƒšแƒ˜แƒ ย แƒจแƒ”แƒ˜แƒขแƒงแƒ•แƒ”แƒ— แƒ›แƒ”แƒขแƒ˜

แƒแƒ› แƒ”แƒšแƒฌแƒ˜แƒ’แƒœแƒ˜แƒก แƒจแƒ”แƒกแƒแƒฎแƒ”แƒ‘

During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. British government officials and military forces proved proficient at defeating or controlling these rebellions. However, these uprisings were much less complex than the modern jihadist insurgency. Past insurgent movements were primarily monolithic or national in form, had very specific local goals, and derived most of their power from the local population. These limitations made past rebellions vulnerable to strong military responses. In contrast, the modern jihadist insurgency is characterized by its complex and global nature. Unlike past insurgent forms that aspired to shape national politics, the jihadist movement espouses larger thematic goals, like overthrowing the global order. The modern jihadist insurgency is also more global in terms of its popular support and operational territory. It makes far better use of communications technology and propaganda to reach the minds and hearts of global audiences. The contemporary international security environment has therefore become a frustrating place for Western powers. Despite great technological and military advances, British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. Operational failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for the West to rethink and retool its current COIN strategy. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations.

แƒจแƒ”แƒแƒคแƒแƒกแƒ”แƒ— แƒ”แƒก แƒ”แƒšแƒฌแƒ˜แƒ’แƒœแƒ˜

แƒ’แƒ•แƒ˜แƒ—แƒฎแƒแƒ แƒ˜แƒ— แƒ—แƒฅแƒ•แƒ”แƒœแƒ˜ แƒแƒ–แƒ แƒ˜.

แƒ˜แƒœแƒคแƒแƒ แƒ›แƒแƒชแƒ˜แƒ แƒฌแƒแƒ™แƒ˜แƒ—แƒฎแƒ•แƒแƒกแƒ—แƒแƒœ แƒ“แƒแƒ™แƒแƒ•แƒจแƒ˜แƒ แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒ—

แƒกแƒ›แƒแƒ แƒขแƒคแƒแƒœแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜ แƒ“แƒ แƒขแƒแƒ‘แƒšแƒ”แƒขแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜
แƒ“แƒแƒแƒ˜แƒœแƒกแƒขแƒแƒšแƒ˜แƒ แƒ”แƒ— Google Play Books แƒแƒžแƒ˜ Android แƒ“แƒ iPad/iPhone แƒ›แƒแƒฌแƒงแƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒแƒ‘แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒกแƒ—แƒ•แƒ˜แƒก. แƒ˜แƒก แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒขแƒฃแƒ แƒแƒ“ แƒ’แƒแƒœแƒแƒฎแƒแƒ แƒชแƒ˜แƒ”แƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒก แƒกแƒ˜แƒœแƒฅแƒ แƒแƒœแƒ˜แƒ–แƒแƒชแƒ˜แƒแƒก แƒ—แƒฅแƒ•แƒ”แƒœแƒก แƒแƒœแƒ’แƒแƒ แƒ˜แƒจแƒ—แƒแƒœ แƒ“แƒ แƒกแƒแƒจแƒฃแƒแƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒแƒก แƒ›แƒแƒ’แƒชแƒ”แƒ›แƒ—, แƒฌแƒแƒ˜แƒ™แƒ˜แƒ—แƒฎแƒแƒ— แƒกแƒแƒกแƒฃแƒ แƒ•แƒ”แƒšแƒ˜ แƒ™แƒแƒœแƒขแƒ”แƒœแƒขแƒ˜ แƒœแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒกแƒ›แƒ˜แƒ”แƒ  แƒแƒ“แƒ’แƒ˜แƒšแƒแƒก, แƒ แƒแƒ’แƒแƒ แƒช แƒแƒœแƒšแƒแƒ˜แƒœ, แƒ˜แƒกแƒ” แƒฎแƒแƒ–แƒ’แƒแƒ แƒ”แƒจแƒ” แƒ แƒ”แƒŸแƒ˜แƒ›แƒจแƒ˜.
แƒšแƒ”แƒžแƒขแƒแƒžแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜ แƒ“แƒ แƒ™แƒแƒ›แƒžแƒ˜แƒฃแƒขแƒ”แƒ แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜
Google Play-แƒจแƒ˜ แƒจแƒ”แƒซแƒ”แƒœแƒ˜แƒšแƒ˜ แƒแƒฃแƒ“แƒ˜แƒแƒฌแƒ˜แƒ’แƒœแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒก แƒ›แƒแƒกแƒ›แƒ”แƒœแƒ แƒ—แƒฅแƒ•แƒ”แƒœแƒ˜ แƒ™แƒแƒ›แƒžแƒ˜แƒฃแƒขแƒ”แƒ แƒ˜แƒก แƒ•แƒ”แƒ‘-แƒ‘แƒ แƒแƒฃแƒ–แƒ”แƒ แƒ˜แƒก แƒ’แƒแƒ›แƒแƒงแƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒ— แƒจแƒ”แƒ’แƒ˜แƒซแƒšแƒ˜แƒแƒ—.
แƒ”แƒšแƒฌแƒแƒ›แƒ™แƒ˜แƒ—แƒฎแƒ•แƒ”แƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜ แƒ“แƒ แƒกแƒฎแƒ•แƒ แƒ›แƒแƒฌแƒงแƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒแƒ‘แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜
แƒ”แƒšแƒ”แƒฅแƒขแƒ แƒแƒœแƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒ›แƒ”แƒšแƒœแƒ˜แƒก แƒ›แƒแƒฌแƒงแƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒแƒ‘แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ–แƒ” แƒฌแƒแƒกแƒแƒ™แƒ˜แƒ—แƒฎแƒแƒ“, แƒ แƒแƒ’แƒแƒ แƒ˜แƒชแƒแƒ Kobo eReaders, แƒ—แƒฅแƒ•แƒ”แƒœ แƒฃแƒœแƒ“แƒ แƒฉแƒแƒ›แƒแƒขแƒ•แƒ˜แƒ แƒ—แƒแƒ— แƒคแƒแƒ˜แƒšแƒ˜ แƒ“แƒ แƒ’แƒแƒ“แƒแƒ˜แƒขแƒแƒœแƒแƒ— แƒ˜แƒ’แƒ˜ แƒ—แƒฅแƒ•แƒ”แƒœแƒก แƒ›แƒแƒฌแƒงแƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒแƒ‘แƒแƒจแƒ˜. แƒ“แƒแƒฎแƒ›แƒแƒ แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒก แƒชแƒ”แƒœแƒขแƒ แƒ˜แƒก แƒ“แƒ”แƒขแƒแƒšแƒฃแƒ แƒ˜ แƒ˜แƒœแƒกแƒขแƒ แƒฃแƒฅแƒชแƒ˜แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒก แƒ›แƒ˜แƒฎแƒ”แƒ“แƒ•แƒ˜แƒ— แƒ’แƒแƒ“แƒแƒ˜แƒขแƒแƒœแƒ”แƒ— แƒคแƒแƒ˜แƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜ แƒ›แƒฎแƒแƒ แƒ“แƒแƒญแƒ”แƒ แƒ˜แƒš แƒ”แƒšแƒฌแƒแƒ›แƒ™แƒ˜แƒ—แƒฎแƒ•แƒ”แƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ–แƒ”.