Knowledge and Practical Interests
Okt 2005 · Clarendon Press
5,0star
1 ulasanreport
eBook
204
Halaman
family_home
Memenuhi syarat
info
reportRating dan ulasan tidak diverifikasi Pelajari Lebih Lanjut
Tentang eBook ini
Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. So whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. Stanley defends this thesis against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive (contextualism about knowledge attributions), and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim (relativism about knowledge). In the course of his argument Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well.
Rating dan ulasan
5,0
1 ulasan
Beri rating eBook ini
Sampaikan pendapat Anda.
Informasi bacaan
Smartphone dan tablet
Instal aplikasi Google Play Buku untuk Android dan iPad/iPhone. Aplikasi akan disinkronkan secara otomatis dengan akun Anda dan dapat diakses secara online maupun offline di mana saja.
Laptop dan komputer
Anda dapat mendengarkan buku audio yang dibeli di Google Play menggunakan browser web komputer.
eReader dan perangkat lainnya
Untuk membaca di perangkat e-ink seperti Kobo eReaders, Anda perlu mendownload file dan mentransfernya ke perangkat Anda. Ikuti petunjuk Pusat bantuan yang mendetail untuk mentransfer file ke eReaders yang didukung.
