Command in War
يناير 1987 · Harvard University Press
4.0star
مراجعتان (2)report
كتاب إلكتروني
352
صفحة
reportلم يتم التحقّق من التقييمات والمراجعات. مزيد من المعلومات
معلومات عن هذا الكتاب الإلكتروني
Many books have been written about strategy, tactics, and great commanders. This is the first book to deal exclusively with the nature of command itself, and to trace its development over two thousand years from ancient Greece to Vietnam. It treats historically the whole variety of problems involved in commanding armies, including staff organization and administration, communications methods and technologies, weaponry, and logistics. And it analyzes the relationship between these problems and military strategy.
In vivid descriptions of key battles and campaigns—among others, Napoleon at Jena, Moltke’s Königgrätz campaign, the Arab–Israeli war of 1973, and the Americans in Vietnam—Martin van Creveld focuses on the means of command and shows how those means worked in practice. He finds that technological advances such as the railroad, breech-loading rifles, the telegraph and later the radio, tanks, and helicopters all brought commanders not only new tactical possibilities but also new limitations.
Although vast changes have occurred in military thinking and technology, the one constant has been an endless search for certainty—certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy’s forces; certainty about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment in which war is fought, from the weather and terrain to radioactivity and the presence of chemical warfare agents; and certainty about the state, intentions, and activities of one’s own forces. The book concludes that progress in command has usually been achieved less by employing more advanced technologies than by finding ways to transcend the limitations of existing ones.
In vivid descriptions of key battles and campaigns—among others, Napoleon at Jena, Moltke’s Königgrätz campaign, the Arab–Israeli war of 1973, and the Americans in Vietnam—Martin van Creveld focuses on the means of command and shows how those means worked in practice. He finds that technological advances such as the railroad, breech-loading rifles, the telegraph and later the radio, tanks, and helicopters all brought commanders not only new tactical possibilities but also new limitations.
Although vast changes have occurred in military thinking and technology, the one constant has been an endless search for certainty—certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy’s forces; certainty about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment in which war is fought, from the weather and terrain to radioactivity and the presence of chemical warfare agents; and certainty about the state, intentions, and activities of one’s own forces. The book concludes that progress in command has usually been achieved less by employing more advanced technologies than by finding ways to transcend the limitations of existing ones.
التقييمات والتعليقات
4.0
مراجعتان (2)
تقييم هذا الكتاب الإلكتروني
أخبرنا ما هو رأيك.
معلومات القراءة
الهواتف الذكية والأجهزة اللوحية
ينبغي تثبيت تطبيق كتب Google Play لنظام التشغيل Android وiPad/iPhone. يعمل هذا التطبيق على إجراء مزامنة تلقائية مع حسابك ويتيح لك القراءة أثناء الاتصال بالإنترنت أو بلا اتصال بالإنترنت أينما كنت.
أجهزة الكمبيوتر المحمول وأجهزة الكمبيوتر
يمكنك الاستماع إلى الكتب المسموعة التي تم شراؤها على Google Play باستخدام متصفح الويب على جهاز الكمبيوتر.
أجهزة القراءة الإلكترونية والأجهزة الأخرى
للقراءة على أجهزة الحبر الإلكتروني، مثل أجهزة القارئ الإلكتروني Kobo، عليك تنزيل ملف ونقله إلى جهازك. يُرجى اتّباع التعليمات المفصّلة في مركز المساعدة لتتمكّن من نقل الملفات إلى أجهزة القارئ الإلكتروني المتوافقة.
