The strategic context that led to the Java Sea confrontation had been developing since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, which had initiated a carefully coordinated campaign to seize control of Southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific. The Japanese strategy, known as the Southern Operation, aimed to capture the resource-rich territories of the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, and the Philippines while establishing a defensive perimeter that could protect Japan's expanded empire from Allied counterattack. The rapid success of Japanese forces in capturing Hong Kong, advancing through Malaya toward Singapore, and landing in the Philippines had demonstrated both the effectiveness of Japanese military planning and the vulnerability of Allied defensive positions throughout the region.
The American-British-Dutch-Australian Command, hastily established in January 1942 under the leadership of British General Sir Archibald Wavell, represented an ambitious attempt to coordinate Allied resistance against the Japanese advance despite the enormous challenges posed by geographic distances, communication difficulties, and conflicting national priorities. The ABDACOM structure reflected the desperate nature of Allied efforts to defend Southeast Asia with limited resources while also highlighting the complex political and military relationships that would complicate effective coordination during the critical battles that lay ahead.