关于此电子书
This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer. The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It is acknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an account of what truth consists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book.
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